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455 
GARNISHMENT OF RECEIVABLES IN  
CHINESE LAW 
The sign over the cash register at Shakey’s Pizza Parlor reads, “We 
made a deal with the bank. We don’t cash checks, and the bank doesn’t 
make pizza.” 
The unarticulated premise—banks, not businesses, provide financial 
services—seems sound. In reality, however, trade credit is an important 
source of financing for businesses and their customers. It is sometimes 
used even when bank credit is available.1 In China eighty percent of 
businesses extend some form of trade credit.2
Trade credit creates a hazard for lenders to businesses who are 
themselves extending unsecured credit. Debtors who appear solvent may 
fail to collect debts owed to them by third parties. Yet for a long time 
receivables remained beyond the reach of creditors to Chinese companies.3  
Recently, China changed its laws to allow creditors to execute against 
receivables.4 Ostensibly aimed at easing the problem of debts between 
State-owned Enterprises,5 these measures also help fill in the detail of pre-
bankruptcy debtor-creditor law. After all, once a debtor has lost or 
encumbered all its real and movable assets, the receivables could be the 
final straw before the debtor goes bankrupt. 
Trade credit is only efficient if the risk-adjusted cost of lending is 
lower than the cost of replacing the customer of suffering breach of 
contract. Difficulty proving a prima facie case, lax enforcement, and local 
protectionism will make garnishment orders difficult to obtain and 
execute. Asymmetries between pre-bankruptcy and bankruptcy priorities 
will limit the provision’s practical benefit. It is also too easy for other 
creditors to intervene in a debt collection action. Each of these difficulties 
 
 
 1. See Vicente Cuñat, Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers 
(LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper Series, No. 365) (2000) (on file with WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.), available at http://rlab.lse.90UC/ opening/papers/cunat.pdf (last visited Oct. 
27, 2003). 
 2. State Council Development Research Center, Discussion of Several Problems of 
Safeguarding Societal Credit Order, Jan. 22, 2002 (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.). 
National triangular debt was ¥124 billion in 1989, ¥700 billion in 1994, and ¥1.1 trillion (US$132 
billion) in 1998. Id. 
 3. A receivable is “a balance owed by a debtor; a debt owed by a customer to an enterprise for 
goods or services.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13-14 (Abridged 7th ed. 1999). 
 4. See infra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Woguo daiwuquan zhidu shenzhi [Analysis of Our Country’s Subrogation Rights 
System], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT REPORTS] Dec. 5, 2001 (describing inter-enterprise 
debt as “an important aim” of the contract law provisions). 
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will increase costs and risks for trade creditors who seek to exercise their 
rights under the new garnishment provisions. 
Part I of this Note introduces a framework for evaluating distributional 
rules.6 Part II describes the status quo in China: trade debt, creditors’ rights 
over receivables, and bankruptcy. Part III considers why judgments are 
difficult to enforce in China. Part IV examines how well the system 
functions as a whole, particularly whether the debt collection regime suits 
the needs of debtors, creditors, and other constituencies. Part V makes 
several proposals for procedural and substantive changes to China’s 
garnishment regime. 
I. THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING EFFECTIVE PRE-BANKRUPTCY DEBT 
COLLECTION RULES 
The debt collection system can create incentives for transactions by 
generating predictable outcomes. Canny investors and traders seeking to 
participate in the market will look to the enforceability of rights.7 
Unexpected risk causes creditors to lose in the short-term,8 but credit terms 
eventually reflect the risk of default.9 Anything causing uncertainty of 
 
 
 6. “Distributional rule” means a rule that determines which of a debtor’s several creditors will 
be entitled to repayment, and the relative amounts of repayment. It does not include rules defining the 
substantive rights that gave rise to a debt.
 7. For a discussion of the effect of legal certainty on investment decisions, see the comments of 
an attorney handling energy contracts for Allen & Overy (A&O) in Global Overview: The Lawyers, 
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, June 18, 1998.  
The lawyer’s primary role is to establish what the current legal system is and to try to 
structure the transaction to ensure the likelihood of success if rights have to be enforced or 
preserved. A&O practice is to structure the transaction initially having regard to international 
practice, and then to test the local legal system’s approach to key areas, for example, the 
taking and enforcement of security, and insolvency procedures generally. 
Id. 
 8. The best-known clash of foreign creditors and Chinese debtors took place in 1998, when the 
Guangdong International and Trust Investment Corporation (GITIC) went bankrupt, leaving 
RMB¥26.14 billion (US$3.1 billion) in debts owed to domestic and foreign entities. See Mitchell Silk, 
Michael Openshaw, and Virginia Hulme, The Lessons of GITIC: Bankruptcy Proceeds as Scheduled, 
CHINA BUS. REV., May 1, 1999, at 36-37.  
 GITIC was established in 1980 as a window for foreign currency borrowing by provincial 
enterprises. Id. at 37. It eventually became the second largest “ITIC” in China. Id. at 36. Although 
GITIC was originally open only to foreign lenders, it eventually borrowed from domestic entities 
directly and through overseas branches. Id. at 37. It also had more than 20,000 individual creditors. 
China: GITIC Creditors Seen Facing Long Wait, CHINA BUS. INFORMATION NETWORK, Jan. 14, 1999, 
1999 WL 5617894.  
 In the bankruptcy proceedings, individual creditors were paid 100%. Id. Other creditors’ average 
recovery rate as of February 2000 was 3.836%, but significant assets, including a hotel valued at up to 
RMB¥2.1 billion (US$253 million), remained to be liquidated. Guangdong High Court Aims to 
Complete GITIC Liquidation by Year-end, AFX NEWS, Feb. 14, 2001 (available on Lexis). 
 9. This effect may be observed in the wide disparity among credit terms offered to United States 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/15
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repayment should inflate credit rates or result in credit denials. In this 
predictable enforcement of debt contracts will encourage the increased 
foreign and domestic investment that China’s leaders see as necessary for 
job creation.10
To fulfill its basic purpose, a debt collection system must provide a 
mechanism for paying claims. When a debtor has more assets than 
liabilities, the distribution rule is simple: pay all debts when due. If a 
debtor has liabilities greater than assets, however, allowing debt collection 
impairs business operation, and can drive it to the point of collapse. Thus, 
in addition to providing for distribution, the law must intervene 
occasionally to prevent debt collection from pushing a company into 
premature bankruptcy. 
These two goals, conserving the debtor’s assets and satisfying the 
creditors’ claims, appear at first to stand in opposition to one another. The 
reality is to the contrary. If a company has liquidity problems, allowing 
creditors to garnish receivables may be the best way to ensure that the 
debtor (and its assets) survive to pay further debts. 
A. Conservation of the Debtor’s Assets 
One function of debt collection law is to conserve the assets from 
which debts may be settled. From a creditor’s perspective, the debtor’s 
assets are a pool of funds for settlement of debts, and conservation 
measures protect the pool. An effective debtor-creditor law will seek to 
preserve the maximum value of the debtor’s assets, so the maximum 
amount remains to satisfy creditors’ claims. Preservation of assets may 
require halting other proceedings, including execution of judgments in 
order to preserve the business as a going concern.  
Creditors have a divided loyalty with respect to conservation. An 
individual creditor’s primary interest is receiving payment. Thus, the 
 
 
consumers. See, e.g., New Assault on Your Credit Rating, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 2001, at 20. A 
scholar who analyzed lenders’ public filings estimated that, between 1995 and 1999, subprime 
borrowers paid median rates 2.2% to 4.06% higher than prime borrowers. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The 
Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and 
the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 537 (2000). The main determinants of 
subprime status are previous payment behavior and current level of indebtedness. New Assault on Your 
Credit Rating, supra. 
 10. Last year, Zhu Rongji told the National People’s Congress of the need to “continue 
improving the investment environment and the legal system. We need to do everything in accordance 
with the law, render better services to investors, improve our efficiency, and standardize our work 
related to attracting foreign businesses and investment.” Chinese Premier’s Government Work Report 
at National People’s Congress, BBC MONITORING, Mar. 5, 2002, 2002 WL 15936547. 
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individual creditor has an incentive to maximize the value of only the 
assets subject to execution, and then only to the extent proceeds do not 
exceed the amount of that creditor’s debt. As a group, creditors have an 
interest in maximizing the value not just of any single asset subject to 
levy, but of the debtor’s property as a whole. 
Preventing a single creditor from taking the debtor’s property is 
sometimes necessary. For example, seizing inventory may result in 
immediate loss of goodwill for the debtor company and harm valuable 
trading relationships.11 This result would be contrary to the best interests 
of the creditors as a group. The risk may be at its highest when the 
debtor’s inability to pay arises solely from liquidity woes.12 If a single 
creditor’s action will push the debtor closer to insolvency, other creditors 
may hasten to file actions against the troubled debtor.13  
Individual creditors’ self-serving actions are not inherently inimical to 
conservation. Active monitoring by creditors may also help to ensure that 
the debtor does not dissipate or consume assets needed for debt 
repayment.14 If a creditor believes the debtor will soon lack funds to pay a 
debt, she may seek a court order preventing liquidation of the debtor’s 
assets.15 Receivables may require the same urgent attention if the debtor’s 
debtors are failing businesses as well.16 Creditor actions may also spur the 
debtor into action; once compulsory execution becomes imminent, the 
 
 
 11. Some of this lost goodwill will be illicit, reflecting the secondary creditor’s desire to avoid 
paying its debts and expectations of further, easy credit. 
 12. Ex post efficiencies of responses to various business scenarios are explored in Clas Wihlborg 
& Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Infrastructure Requirements in the Area of Bankruptcy Law, 
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 2001, 286-87 (2001). Wihlborg and 
Shubhashis compare economic distress, in which the net present value of a companys cash flow is 
negative, with financial distress, in which liquidity is a problem or the net present value of cash flow is 
insufficient to service debt. Id. They argue piecemeal liquidation will maximize the value of a business 
where it is in economic distress and even improved management would not yield a positive net cash 
flow value. Other scenarios would favor a change of management, debt-equity swaps, or restructuring 
of debt. Id. 
 13. R.M. GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 17-24 (1990). 
 14. See Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper Domain, 36 VANDERBILT 
L. REV. 829, 835 (1985). Professor Jackson describes how action by a few creditors can benefit the 
debtor pool as a whole by controlling debtors’ risky or inequitable behavior. If a few large creditors 
insist on contractual terms prohibiting certain acts, “[o]ther creditors (including nonconsensual 
creditors) may be able to profit by the monitoring of the debtor undertaken by those whose contracts 
do prohibit such activity.” Id. 
 15. In China, if a debt will be difficult or impossible to collect, the court may issue an order to 
preserve property relevant to the dispute, either on its own initiative, or on the request of a party in 
interest. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa [PRC Civil Procedure Law], arts. 92, 94, 
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI HUIBIAN (1991), at 28 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law]. 
 16. This assumes that the secondary debtor is in economic distress. See Analysis of Our 
Country’s Subrogation Rights System, supra note 5. Postponed collection forces the primary creditor 
to underwrite the risk that the secondary creditor will go bankrupt. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/15
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debtor is forced to surrender property, collect its own outstanding debts, or 
file for bankruptcy.17 
B. Satisfaction of Claims 
The system also requires a mechanism to distribute proceeds to 
creditors. A well-designed system will have distributional rules to 
determine, for example, what part of the proceeds from any seizure of 
assets must be paid to the creditors, the share that each litigant receives, 
and the allocation of collection costs. 
Maximizing the litigating creditor’s share of a successful levy and sale 
will reward the creditor who actively monitors his debtors. Creditors’ 
incentives to bring suit will vary depending on which distributional rule 
applies. As the creditor’s perceived risk of non-collection rises, so rises the 
risk that the creditor will decide that the costs and risks are too great, and 
simply write off the debt.18  
Most systems, including the Chinese system, rely on creditors to act. 
The size of a creditor’s expected share may be a significant factor in its 
decision to bring a debt collection action. A debtor in default is unlikely to 
have but a single creditor, and each additional creditor puts an additional 
demand on the asset pool. A debtor unable, or unwilling, to pay its debts 
may declare bankruptcy up to the time of execution.19 If it does, the 
primary creditor will end up one of many picking at the carcass.20
 
 
 17. Professor Elizabeth Warren, describing the U.S. system, remarks that “[s]tate law promises 
that if the creditor is persistent, the corporate debtor can escape payment only through death: the 
corporation must cease operations and return its charter to the state. Nothing in state law allows a 
corporation to continue to operate while denying the enforceability of a lawful debt.” Elizabeth 
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987). 
 18. A thumbnail sketch of law and economics as applied to the debt collection decision can be 
found in David G. Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1995). 
 For a discussion of the effect of predictability of judgments on litigation decisions, see generally 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). See also J. Mark Ramseyer & 
Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 263 (1989) (arguing that highly predictable verdicts in traffic accident cases in Japan have 
resulted in a high proportion of settlements; settlement amounts closely track historical verdict 
amounts). 
 19. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
 20. In the Serengeti, after a dog pack attacks a prey, spotted hyenas (the kleptoparasites) arrive to 
join in the frenzy. See generally C. Carbone et al., Feeding Success in African Wild Dogs: Does 
Kleptoparasitism by Spotted Hyenas Influence Hunting Group Size?, 66 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 318, 319 
(1997). The dogs’ likelihood of feeding to satiation or carcass depletion is directly proportional to the 
dog to hyena ratio at the kill site. Id. at 320. Successful hunting and feeding thus requires the dog pack 
be strong enough to bring down an animal of sufficient size to satisfy both dogs and hyenas, but not so 
large that intra-pack competition depletes the carcass. 
 This analogy must not be taken too far, but it does suggest two conclusions. First, a lone creditor 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Professor Elizabeth Warren has identified a set of policy concerns 
underlying distributional priorities of the United States bankruptcy 
system.21 Of note here are the creditors’ relative abilities to bear the cost of 
default, similarities among creditors, and the incentive effects on pre-
bankruptcy transactions.22 Pre-bankruptcy, however, it is also appropriate 
to consider differences among creditors, which arise from the contracts 
themselves, and from creditors’ relative diligence. 
II. GARNISHMENT IN CHINA 
A. Inter-Enterprise Debt in China 
Chinese government estimates show inter-enterprise debt of almost 
US$132 billion and growing.23 A recent investigation of 342 small and 
medium sized enterprises in Hebei Province found, on average, 
receivables of RMB¥10 million (US$1.2m).24
Inter-enterprise debt in China has often been called “triangular debt.” 
The term was coined to describe unpaid bills among groups of creditors 
that accumulated when the government restricted credit growth in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.25 State-owned firms unable to borrow funds to pay 
for their inputs simply postponed paying their suppliers.26 It is possible 
that at least some of these debt chains may have been linear.27  
Non-State actors, while not as severely affected by central bank credit 
tightening, use trade credit as a flexible financing source available when 
 
 
hunting down assets of a company indebted to a large number of potentially kleptoparasitic creditors is 
unlikely to have its full claim satisfied. Second, there may be some benefit to allowing voluntary 
joinder of creditors claims because the litigation costs would be spread amongst them. To the extent 
that protections are nominally provided against other creditors’ late joinder, the pack will be better 
equipped to withstand the collateral attack. 
 21. These are: (1) creditors’ relative ability to bear the cost of default; (2) incentive effects on 
pre-bankruptcy transactions; (3) similarities among creditors; (4) equity owners as residual creditors; 
and (5) benefits to the bankruptcy estate. Warren, supra note 17, at 790-92. 
 22. Id. 
 23. State Council DRC Paper, supra note 2. The exchange rate used throughout this paper is the 
official US Dollar-peg rate of RMB¥8.3 to US$1. The Bank of China mid-rate on March 16, 2003 was 
¥8.28/$1. Waihui paijia [Foreign Exchange Posted Rates], at http://www.bank-of-china.com/info/ 
qpindex.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
 24. State Council Development Research Center, Hebei: Small and Medium Enterprise 
Triangular Debt Worsens, July 10, 2001 (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.). 
 25. See LI KWOK-SING, A GLOSSARY OF CHINESE POLITICAL TERMS 369-70 (Mary Lok trans., 
1995) (citing Zhong Pengrong, Triangular and Linear Debt Chains, ECON. DAILY, Apr. 10, 1990). 
 26. NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 40-41 (1998). 
 27. Id. Triangular debt exists when A owes B money, B owes C, and C owes A. In this situation 
at least some of the debts cancel out others. Linear debt describes a situation where only the A - B and 
B - C debts exist. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/15
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bank credit or private investment are unavailable.28 A 1997 survey of 
American Chamber of Commerce members showed that forty-four percent 
sometimes extended trade credit, and that twenty-one percent used trade 
credit exclusively.29  
The Chinese experience does not appear to differ significantly from 
Western economies. One study reported that trade credit in the United 
Kingdom and China was twenty percent and twenty-two percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), respectively.30 The debts were cleared at similar 
rates, with payment periods of 2.6 months in China and 2.1 months in the 
United Kingdom.31 On the other hand, inter-enterprise debt is increasing, 
both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP, and debts are being cleared 
more slowly (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Receivables of Industrial Firms32
Year 1990 1994 1996 1998 
Receivables in RMB¥ Billion 90.1 631.4 927 992.2 
As % of GDP 7.7 21.5 22 12.7 
Average Payment Period in Months 0.6 1.9 2.1 ----- 
China’s credit screening systems remain inadequate. In recent years, 
the Government helped establish two credit bureaus in Beijing and 
Shanghai in recent years, with mixed results.33 A report by one business 
 
 
 28. See Cuñat, supra note 1. 
 29. Companies report using “open account” practices. Credit Control: Better Late Than Never, 
CHINA ECON. REV., Feb. 1, 1997, at 31. Survey subjects included members of the Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou American Chambers of Commerce. Id. “Open account” practice carries debits and 
credits forward, with no fixed date for settlement. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 19 (Abridged 7th ed. 
2000). There may be variances between the behavior of foreign and domestic firms. Id. 
 30. GAO SHUMEI & MARK SCHAFFER, FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE IN THE ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN 
TRANSITION COUNTRIES: HOW DOES CHINA COMPARE? 5, 7 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper 
No. 124, 1998). In the United States, nearly sixteen percent of all small business debt is trade credit. 
Allen Berger & Gregory Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private 
Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 613, 620 (1998) (non-
farm, non-financial, non-real estate, small businesses). 
 31. SHUMEI & SCHAFFER, supra note 30, at 5, 7. The payment period is calculated as the ratio of 
end of year receivables to average monthly sales. Id. 
 32. Id. Figures for 1998 were derived from the State Council Research Paper, supra note 2. In 
1998, China’s GDP was RMB¥7.854 trillion (US$946.3 billion). World Bank, available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). To compensate for the inclusion 
of non-industrial firms in the 1998 figure, the receivables have been multiplied by .902. The multiplier 
represents the ratio of 1994 industrial firm receivables to all receivables: 631.4/700. Without the 
adjustment, inter-enterprise debt is fourteen percent of GDP. 
 33. The Beijing Credit Bureau, established in 2002 with investment from government-controlled 
internet provider Capinfo, has sustained large losses over the past year. Capinfo Profit Dips as 
Affiliates in Red, HONG KONG IMAIL, Aug. 12, 2003 (available on Lexis); Sidney Luk, Mainland 
Internet Solutions Provider Capinfo Is Back in the Black, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 22, 
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credit reporting service identified a number of shortcomings with the 
bureaus, such as: backwardness in communications and transportation that 
prevent creditors from investigating debtors, lack of disclosure of civil 
litigation records, inaccurate company registrations, and negative attitudes 
towards requests for credit information disclosures by debtor 
management.34 China recently announced that it was postponing 
compliance with credit screening standards in an international banking 
standards accord.35
B. Legal Framework for Garnishment of Receivables 
Traditionally in China, as in other civil law systems, a creditor holding 
a valid judgment has been able to execute against bank accounts, wages, 
real and movable property, or negotiable instruments.36 This framework 
created a dilemma for the creditor to a business, which had few tangible 
assets, but which held receivables sufficient to pay the debt. Receivables 
are choses in action37 and thus not clearly subject to execution under the 
Civil Procedure Law, which lists only real and movable property.38  
 
 
2003, at 3, 2003 WL 14054382. Shanghai Municipal Government-owned Shanghai Credit Information 
Service claims to have credit information on one in four Shanghai residents. Shanghai Issues Action 
Agenda for Social Credit System, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 21, 2003. A recently-released 
Shanghai Municipal Government agenda calls for Shanghai to become a “metropolis of credit,” 
establishing a joint individual and corporate credit rating system by 2005. Id. Over 3,000 Shanghai 
businesses had received credit ratings by early 2002. China to Create Corporate Credit-Rating 
Regime, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1, 2002. It is unclear whether Shanghai Credit Information Services 
was responsible for all of these ratings. Id. 
 34. Credit Control, supra note 29. The report identified six areas in need of improvement. Id. 
The other two area were: (1) extraneous political factors affecting companies’ stability; and (2) 
confusing and improperly implemented legal rules. Id. 
 35. Zhao Renfeng, China Not Ready for Basel II, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 18, 2003. The agreement, 
formally known as the New Basel Capital Accord, requires all countries to establish standards for 
credit rating and reporting. Bank for International Settlements, New Basel Capital Accord, at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). See generally Michael Imeson, 
Striking a New Accord—Basel II Has Already Been Delayed Until 2006. Can It Overcome the 
Difficulties In Time?, THE BANKER, July 1, 2002.  
 36. See PRC Civil Procedure Law, arts. 221, 222, 223, 228. Compare Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo minshi susong fa (Shixing) [PRC Civil Procedure law (for trial use)], arts. 171-79, 
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GORNHEGUO FAGUI HUIBIAN (1982), at 133, translated in CHINALAW No. 119, 
available at http://www.gis.net/chinalaw/prelaw34.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (allowing execution 
against property, bank accounts, negotiable instruments, wages, other specific performance). 
Execution is limted to the amount of property necessary to satisfy the debt, and may not deprive the 
executee of items necessary for living (shenghuo bixu pin). PRC Civil Procedure Law, art. 223. 
 37. A “chose in action” is a personal right to recover a debt, sum of money, or a thing. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 219 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000). 
 38. PRC Civil Procedure Law, art. 223. 
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In 1998, the Supreme People’s Court interpreted the Civil Procedure 
Law to permit garnishment of receivables.39 Article 73 of the 1999 Unified 
Contract Law codifies the Court’s interpretation with respect to 
garnishment of contracts with only minor changes.40 Both permit a 
primary creditor to collect money from the secondary debtor if the 
debtor’s failure to collect the debt has made the creditor’s claim 
uncollectible.41  
 
 
 39. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan: Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti de 
Guiding (Shixing) [Supreme People’s Court Regulations Regarding Issues of Court Execution (for 
Trial Use)] art. 61, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] (1998 No. 3) at 91 [hereinafter Execution 
Regulations]. 
 In this Note, the term “garnishment” refers to execution against a primary debtor’s receivables. 
Other authors have used the term “subrogation” or “right of subrogation” to describe the operation of 
Article 73. See, e.g., Zhong Jiuanhua & Yu Guanghua, China’s Uniform Contract Law: Progress and 
Problems, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 22 (1999). These are more direct translations of the term 
daiwei quan. XIN HAN YING FAXUE CIDIAN [NEW CHINESE-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY] 127 (3d 
ed. 2000).  
 Traditional forms of subrogation do not require court intervention. Conventional subrogation is an 
express assignment of rights, as when an insurance company pays a policyholder contingent upon an 
express assignment of rights to sue an at-fault third party and receive proceeds up to the amount of its 
payments. See, e.g., French C. CIV 1250. Legal subrogation is an equitable lien over the collateral of 
the primary debt, that vests in a suretor or one who voluntarily pays the secured debt of another. See, 
e.g., French C. CIV 1251. 
 The Chinese garnishment law has different civil law roots. According to the French Civil Code, 
“whoever obligates himself personally is required to fulfill his engagement through all his personal 
and real property, present and to come.” C. Civ Art. 2092 (translated in John Crabb, THE FRENCH 
CIVIL CODE (Revised ed. 1995)). “Personal and real property” does not include choses in action. Thus, 
to protect the creditor’s future interest from the prejudice that would inevitably flow from uncollected 
debt, the French developed the action oblique, a creditor’s right to exercise the rights of the debtor in 
default. C. CIV. art. 1166 (Fr.). The Japanese dai-i soken, which is in most respects identical to the 
Chinese daiwei zhixing, rests on similar logic. J.E. DEBECKER, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE 
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 277-78 (1921). 
 40. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hetong fFa [People’s Republic of China Contract Law] arts. 
73-74, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIN FAGUI HUIBIAN (1999, No. 1), at 16. 
 41. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan: Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa Ruogan 
Wenti de Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application 
of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 
(1999, No. 9) art. 13(2) [hereinafter “SPC Contract Law Interpretation”]. There are actually two types 
of garnishment in China. For simplicity, this Note examines only actions brought under the Uniform 
Contract Law. A judgment creditor can also execute against receivables under supplemental 
regulations to the PRC Civil Procedure Law. Execution Regulations, supra note 39, art. 61. The key 
differences are that the Execution Regulations require a separately obtained enforceable judgment and 
lower the secondary debtor’s burden of proof. 
 The procedure is straightforward. Upon proof of a valid debt owed by the secondary debtor to the 
primary debtor, the court issues a demand that the secondary debtor discharge his debt to the creditor 
rather than the primary debtor. Id. Within fifteen days the secondary debtor must raise a defense or pay 
the primary debtor. Id. art. 61(2). During the fifteen days, the regulations bar the primary debtor from 
waiving or extending the debt. Id. art. 66. If, after receiving the court’s notice, the secondary debtor 
pays the debt directly to the primary debtor, the secondary debtor becomes jointly and severally liable 
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Garnishment satisfies the creditor’s claim by allowing the creditor to 
enforce the primary debtor’s rights against the secondary debtor. If the 
garnishment action succeeds, the secondary debtor pays the primary 
creditor directly. The respective debt obligations between primary creditor 
and primary debtor, and between primary debtor and secondary debtor are 
cancelled.42
The garnishment action has three elements: validity, non-exemption, 
and actual harm.43 Validity requires: that the primary debtor owe a lawful 
 
 
for any resulting shortfall, along with the primary debtor. Id art. 67. For a detailed explanation of the 
Execution Regulations, see FAYUAN ZHIXING YUNZUO SHIWU [COURT EXECUTION PROCEDURES] 
(Dai Jianzhi ed., 1999). 
 42. SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 20. Bing Ling interprets this provision 
to extinguish the prior debts only once the secondary debtor actually pays the debt. Bing, infra note 47, 
at 284. This conclusion is supported, but not dictated, by the commentary text. Compare the following 
two translations: 
If, having tried a subrogation action brought against the secondary obligor by the obligee, the 
people’s court determines that the obligee does have a right of subrogation, the secondary 
obligor shall perform the obligation of payment towards the obligee, and the corresponding 
claim-debt relationships between the obligee and the obligor and between the obligor and the 
secondary obligor shall be extinguished as at that time.” 
SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 20, translated in CHINA L. & PRAC. 43, Mar., 
2000, at 43, 47 (emphasis added). 
Where an obligee brings a suit of subrogation against a secondary obligor, and the People’s 
Court affirms the subrogation, the secondary obligor shall perform the payment obligation, 
whereupon the respective obligee-obligor relationships between the obligee and the obligor, 
and between the obligor and the secondary obligor, are discharged accordingly. 
SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 20, translated in cclaw.net at http://www.cclaw. 
et/download/SPC_Interpretation1.asp (emphasis added). 
 Without commenting on the correctness of either translation, note that Bing’s translation creates 
an interim period between judgment and payment, in which the secondary debtor has an obligation to 
pay the primary creditor, but the primary debtor remains conditionally liable if the obligation is not 
fulfilled. This should increase the likelihood of loss of rights in the event of a post-judgment 
bankruptcy. 
 In France, the saisie attribution (seizure and attribution) procedure provides that, after a brief 
injunction on direct payment, the secondary debtor is obliged to pay the first party creditor directly. 
Loi Portant Réforme des Procédures Civiles d’Execution (Law Reforming Civil Execution 
Procedures), Law No. 91-650, as amended (July 9, 1991). See also Jacqueline Jaeger & Simon Lowe, 
Protection and Enforcement of Creditors’ Rights Under French Law, INT’L COMPANY & COMM. L. 
REV. 1993, 4(7), 255-58. The first party creditor must hold a valid judgment over first party debtor, 
and the debt may not be for back wages. Case No. 97-19732, Bulletin 1999 II No. 147, P. 105 (noting 
that Labor Code provides adequate remedies for garnishment of wages).  
 As a separate matter, it is unclear from the statutory language that a single creditor may pursue 
multiple secondary debtors. The primary creditor’s recovery from the secondary debtor is limited to 
the amount of the primary debt, plus costs. SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 21. 
The Supreme People’s Court has not addressed the situation in which the secondary debt has a lower 
face value than the primary debt. A literal application of the Court’s Interpretation would lead to the 
absurd result that a RMB¥10 million primary debt could be extinguished upon the successful 
prosecution of a single garnishment action over a RMB¥100,000 secondary debt. A better approach 
might discharge the primary debt only to the extent of the secondary debt. 
 43. PRC Contract Law, arts. 73-74. 
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debt to the primary creditor, that the secondary debtor owe a lawful debt to 
the primary debtor, and that both debts be due.44 Non-exemption requires 
that secondary debt not be exempt from garnishment.45  
Actual harm requires that the primary debtor’s failure both to perform 
its obligation to the primary creditor and to exercise its rights against the 
secondary debtor have caused the primary creditor’s claim incapable of 
realization (weineng shixian).46 The debtor de facto must have insufficient 
real or movable assets to satisfy the primary creditor’s claim.47 Actual 
harm is not, however, an insolvency standard. We can infer that actual 
harm is possible even with a primary debtor who is legally solvent.48
The law provides a mechanism for obtaining a protective order over 
property pending litigation.49 However, courts have reached opposite 
conclusions regarding whether they may grant such protective orders over 
the secondary debtor’s receivables.50  
If two or more primary creditors bring action against the same 
secondary debtor, the court may (keyi) consolidate the two suits.51 The 
Civil Procedure Law provides that intervention in a civil suit may not take 
 
 
 44. SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, arts. 11(1), (3). 
 45. Id. art. 11(4). Exempt rights are those that are “exclusively personal,” including alimony, 
child support, wages, pensions, life insurance, and personal injury claims. Id. art. 12. 
 46. Id. art. 13(2). The exercise of rights must be by either judicial or arbitral proceedings. Id. art. 
13(1). 
 47. BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 281 (2002). 
 48. SPC Contract Law Commentary, supra note 41, art. 21. Recoveries in excess of those 
necessary to satisfy the primary creditor’s claim must returned to the primary debtor’s asset pool; the 
law contemplates a debtor with assets greater than liabilities.  
 Legal insolvency occurs when the debtor’s balance sheet indicates liabilities exceeding assets. 
Jackson v. Farmers State Bank, 481 N.E.2d 395, 403 n.7 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1985). Equity insolvency 
occurs when a debtor is unable “to pay his debts as they come due in the ordinary course of business.” 
Id. 
 49. PRC Civil Procedure Law, art. 92. If a judgment is difficult or impossible to execute, a court 
may issue an order to preserve property relevant to the dispute, either sua sponte or on the request of a 
party in interest. Id. arts. 92, 94. A creditor garnishing receivables must post a security deposit over the 
secondary debtor’s assets. Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 17 
 50. Randall Peerenboom & Zhang Dacai, Preservation of Assets in China: Law and Reality, 
CHINA L. & PRAC. (Feb. 2000), at 44. The law only allows such orders over property (zechan), and 
although the trend has been toward recognition of receivables as a form of property, this is an as-yet 
unsettled point of law. Id. The Supreme People’s Court appears to favor treating debts as a type of 
property; the Court’s most recent bankruptcy regulations describe the estate as including “articles, 
debts, intellectual property, and other property and property rights.” Zuigao Renmin Fayuan: Guanyu 
Shenli qiye pochan anjian ruogan wentideguiding [Supreme People’s Court Regulations Regarding 
Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gong bao 
[Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 
(2002) [hereinafter SPC Bankruptcy Regulations]. 
 51. SPC Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 16. The court may also join the primary 
debtor as a necessary party; this may be essential if the secondary debtor raises affirmative defenses. 
Id.; see also Bing, supra note 30, at 282. 
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place after the entry of judgment.52 Before judgment is entered, however, 
there appears to be no limit on a court’s power to allow joinder of claims. 
Neither the legislature nor the court have specified how the proceeds of a 
joined action are to be shared.53
C. The Fate of Receivables in Bankruptcy 
Because garnishment of receivables is conditioned on actual harm to 
the creditor, and not just acts which render the debt uncollectible, its 
greatest utility will be against failing companies.54 In that context, a 
creditor’s “right” to these measures attaches when the debtor would be 
unable to raise cash to pay its obligations without the receivable. The right 
is extinguished when a bankruptcy petition is filed on the debtor’s 
behalf.55
Generally speaking, China’s bankruptcy “law” is a patchwork of laws, 
regulations, and pronouncements.56 A new bankruptcy law has been 
 
 
 52. A third party whose claim has a separate basis but whose interests will be affected by the 
outcome of the action may file a request to intervene. PRC Civil Procedure Law, supra note 15, at 56. 
The court can also give notice to third parties whose rights may be affected. Id. At least one treatise 
views potential prejudice to a third party from another creditor bringing a claim likely to render the 
debtor insolvent as adequate grounds for joinder. See MINSHI SUSONG FA [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 
124-25 (Jiang Wei ed., 2000). 
 53. In an article contemporaneous with the passage of the Unified Contract Law, Professor Wang 
Liming proposes pro-rata sharing. Wang Liming, An Inquiry into Several Difficult Problems in 
Enacting China’s Uniform Contract Law, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 351, 388 (Keith Hand trans.). It 
may be inferred from his proposal that the matter had not yet been settled at the time of enactment. 
Sharing of proceeds has not been the subject of subsequent clarification by the court. 
 54. There will be situations in which the debtor is not a failing company but nevertheless causes 
actual harm, such as by failing to pursue a debt or gratuitously transferring property. Such a situation 
should arise infrequently because the challenged action would be contrary to both the primary 
creditor’s interest in prompt repayment and the primary debtor’s interest in conserving its capital. 
 55. Chinese law provides for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy petitions. SPC 
Bankruptcy Regulations, supra note 50, arts. 6-7. 
 56. China’s first Bankruptcy Law was passed in 1986. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiye pochan 
fa [Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Use)] FAGUI HUIBIAN (1986), at 58; 
Henry Zheng, The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Use): A 
Translation, 4 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 733, 733 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law]. 
 The Law is simple, with just forty-three articles, and applies only to state-owned enterprises. Id. It 
provides for handling of petitions, creditors meeting, mandatory conciliation, optional attempts at 
reorganization, conservation and liquidation of the estate, and distribution of the estate proceeds. Id. 
The 1991 Civil Procedure Law included a chapter running just seven articles addressing the 
bankruptcy of private enterprises, or “enterprise legal persons” (qiyefaren). PRC Civil Procedure Law, 
arts. 199-206. The Company Law made the Bankruptcy Law’s provisions applicable to non-State 
Owned Enterprise bankruptcies. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongcifa [Company Law of the 
People’s Republic of China], arts. 189-94, translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar., 1994, at 7, 47-48. 
 In July 2002, the Supreme People’s Court issued detailed bankruptcy regulations, giving scope 
and depth to the bankruptcy regime. Zuigao renmin fayuan: Guanyu shenli qiye pochan anjian ruogan 
wenti de guiding [Supreme People’s Court Regulations Regarding Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy 
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circulated in draft form since 1995, but it is not expected to pass for 
several years.57 Institutions—financial institutions, trustees, and courts—
lack technical skills and training capacity,58 and ordinary creditors often 
lack effective representation.59
Five features of China’s bankruptcy law are of interest for the present 
inquiry: (1) an enterprise may only declare bankruptcy when it is “unable 
to pay its debts when they fall due”;60 (2) a creditor may bring an 
involuntary petition;61 (3) a debtor’s receivables pass into the bankruptcy 
estate;62 (4) execution of judgments is frozen at the start of the bankruptcy 
 
 
Cases], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the Supreme 
People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] (2002 No. 5), at 155 [hereinafter SPC Bankruptcy 
Regulations]. These derive statutory authority from the Bankruptcy Law and Civil Procedure Law 
provisions. 
 For an enlightening discussion of the current debates surrounding the Bankruptcy Law, including 
factors favoring and preventing passage, see Gebhardt & Olbrich, New Developments in the Reform of 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law, 12 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6-7 (2000). Obstacles cited include opposition by 
banks unwilling to allow the extent of their bad loan exposure to be revealed and fear of widespread 
unemployment and pension loss. Id. Factors favoring passage include the problems encountered in 
administering the GITIC bankruptcy. For information about GITIC, see supra note 8. Id. 
 57. NPC Standing Committee vice-Chairman Cheng Siwei has said the law might not pass until 
2008. Guy de Jonquieres, China Bankruptcy Law Faces Further Delays, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at 
8. 
 58. See World Bank, Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: A Case and Agenda for 
Reforming the Insolvency System, Sept. 20, 2000, at 43-44, at http://www.worldbank.org.en/English/ 
content/bankruptcy.pdf. The report states that bankruptcies did not treat claims in a consistent manner; 
some merged enterprises assumed only the bank debts and not any trade debts. Id. at v, vi. These 
practices may have been abated. Id. 
 Courts handling private sector bankruptcies have used provisions intended to apply only to State-
owned Enterprise bankruptcies as a justification for abrogating creditor rights. Zhang Weimin, Report 
Says Half of Restructured PRC Enterprises Evade Payment of Financial Debts, XINHUA DOMESTIC 
SERVICE, Aug. 17, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0817. Some enterprises, “without the approval of high 
authorities,” made resettlement payments from funds that should have been used to pay debt. Id. 
 59. According to the World Bank study, the Liquidation Committee “consists usually of 
representatives from various municipal agencies (for economy & trade, labor, land, finance, etc.) and 
the central bank branch.” Id. Senior officials are often left in control of the enterprise during 
liquidation. Id. The only creditor in a State-owned Enterprise’s liquidation committee may be the 
central bank. Id. 
 60. Bankruptcy Law, art. 3. Under the Bankruptcy Regulations, the term “unable to repay debts 
when they fall due” means that the debts are due for payment and the debtor obviously cannot repay 
them. Bankruptcy Regulations, art. 31. The same term is used in both the Bankruptcy Law and the 
Civil Procedure Law, but the Bankruptcy Regulations define the term with reference only to the 
former. See Joseph Lam & James Wong, Bankrupt in China, at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2002-
11/Nov02-china.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). It is thus unclear whether the Bankruptcy 
Regulations’ definition applies to non-State-owned Enterprise bankruptcies arising under the Civil 
Procedure Law. Id. For the purpose of the present discussion, it is assumed that the issue would be 
decided in a similar manner for both State-owned Enterprise and non-State-owned Enterprise 
bankruptcies. 
 61. Bankruptcy Law, art. 7. 
 62. Id. art. 3. 
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case;63 (5) priority of payments is as follows: secured debts, administration 
expenses of the estate, wage and pension debts, taxes, and finally 
unsecured debts.64
D. Prospects for Enforcement 
A judgment is of little value without enforcement, or the threat of 
enforcement. China’s enforcement problems (zhixing nan) have long been 
a source of uncertainty about the value of recourse to the courts. Indeed, as 
of January 2000, 850,000 judgments totaling RMB¥259 billion (US$31.2 
billion) remained unexecuted.65  
Non-enforcement commonly results from local protectionism (difang 
baohu zhuyi), corruption, or co-optation of courts by local elites.66 Former 
President Jiang Zemin,67 former Premier Zhu Rongji,68 and Supreme 
People’s Court President Xiao Yang69 have all identified local 
protectionism as a major obstacle to fair case administration. Judges are 
subject to local political pressures because they are locally appointed and 
lack the security of tenure.70 As such, judges may find it difficult to 
withstand pressure from officials who have financial or political interest in 
the disputes before them.  
Inadequate court resources also contribute to non-enforcement. 
Execution officers may lack the training, funding, or legal authority to 
 
 
 63. Bankruptcy Regulations, art. 65. 
 64. Id. art. 58. The priorities are not specified in the Regulations, but are incorporated from 
Bankruptcy Law, art. 37 by reference. But see infra note 103 and accompanying text, describing super-
priority given to employee resettlement schemes. 
 65. PRC Supreme Court Issues Regulations on Enforcing Orders, Jan. 28, 2000, FBIS-CHI-
2000-0128. 
 66. See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of 
Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 44 (1996) [hereinafter Power and Politics]. Local 
protectionism is probably best understood not as a geographic bias, but as a tendency by actors to 
favor other actors inside one’s own network. Such networks could be a geographic subdivision, the 
actor’s guanxi (personal connections) web, ancestral ties or a county or village. Whether one is “local” 
enough to garner protection is left to the subjective view of the decision maker. For a discussion of the 
role of networking in the context of planning China ventures, see Peter L.K. Wong & Paul Ellis, Social 
Ties and Partner Identification in Sino-Hong Kong International Joint Ventures, 33 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 267 (2002). 
 67. Shao Zongwei, Judicial Reform Prudent, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 22, 2002, 2002 WL 7167753. 
 68. Erik Eckholm, Chinese Hear From Premier On Threats To Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2002, at A5. 
 69. Lu Guoqing, Supreme Court’s Xiao Yang Conducts Investigation in Hebei, Aug. 27, 1999, 
FBIS-CHI-1999-0914. 
 70. Basic Level People’s Court judges are appointed by local officials. Power and Politics, supra 
note 66, at 8-10. Higher Level People’s Court judges are appointed by provincial officials. Id. 
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effectively execute judgments.71 Unsatisfactory discovery provisions may 
hamper litigation, and creditors may find themselves unable to compel 
banks or other third parties to disclose debtors’ assets.72 Professor Donald 
Clarke has argued that the internal organization of the courts reflects a lack 
of emphasis upon enforcement.73 As a result, basic courts give priority to 
criminal adjudication and sentencing, rather than execution of civil 
judgments.74
Courts employ a variety of tactics to help debtors avoid execution. 
They may delay proceedings to allow debtors to freeze or transfer assets.75 
Another delay tactic is to demand to examine the records giving rise to the 
judgment.76 Although courts must respect judgments issued by courts in 
other jurisdictions, in practice the executing court may attempt to review 
the substance of the judgment.77 A local court may refuse to execute a 
judgment obtained in another jurisdiction without concessions from the 
judgment creditor, or may demand that the issuing court pay the costs of 
execution.78  
Sometimes the delay mechanism is simply heavy-handed 
obstructionism. In 1998, for example, creditors to Chongqing Special Steel 
Corp. obtained RMB¥700 million (US$84.3 million) in judgments. After 
 
 
 71. See generally Power and Politics, supra note 66; Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from 
Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 
(2001) [hereinafter Seek Truth from Facts]. Peerenboom cites instances of judges being physically 
threatened or abused by parties who resist compulsory execution. Id. at 295. The Supreme People’s 
Court staff have been quoted as saying it was “not uncommon for criminals who resist court 
enforcement efforts . . . to become violent.” PRC Supreme Court Issues Regulations on Enforcing 
Orders, supra note 65. 
 72. There is no right to discovery of evidence, although the People’s Court may have a duty to 
collect it and the power to demand it from defendant and others. Civil Procedure Law, arts. 54, 65. The 
Court may compel a debtor to provide information about its assets. See Seek Truth from Facts, supra 
note 71, at 292. Despite this sweeping power, courts generally expect a litigant to provide details of a 
party’s assets. Id. 
 73. Power and Politics, supra note 66, at 37-38. The president of a court is in charge of criminal 
adjudication, and the vice president of civil adjudication. Id. The vice president’s assistant is in charge 
of civil execution. Id. at 37. 
 74. Id. at 37-38. 
 75. Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 71, at 287. Peerenboom describes a case in which a party 
holding an arbitral award went to the bank with enforcement personnel, only to be told the bank 
president was away and his approval was necessary. Upon returning the next day, the creditor 
discovered that a higher level court in the same city froze the bank account, depriving the creditor of 
the single identified asset against which it could execute. Id. at 278. 
 76. Power and Politics, supra note 66, at 46. The requesting court would lack power to dispute 
the judgment based on anything it found in those records. Id. at 43. 
 77. Id. at 44. 
 78. Id. at 44, 46. In one case a Basic Level court demanded a waiver of fifty percent of the 
amount before it would enforce a judgment obtained from another region’s Intermediate Level court. 
Id. at 44. 
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the local court executed against RMB¥92 million (US$11.1 million) in 
bank accounts, the Chongqing government “halted execution.”79 Lawyers 
working in China have also cited instances of court officials helping 
debtors hide assets.80  
Uncertainty increases risk of non-recovery, and inefficiency increases 
costs; together these risks create opportunities for coercion. In one 
instance a foreign party settled an arbitral award for half its face value, 
although the debtor held ten separate debts, which totaled more than the 
entire debt.81
Foreign creditors have one advantage in ensuring the preservation of 
assets once litigation commences. A foreign party’s request for a 
protective order falls under the jurisdiction of the relevant Intermediate 
People’s Court.82 This factor may help foreign parties avoid conflicted 
Basic Level People’s Courts, but may prove cold comfort for a foreign 
party involved in a dispute with a debtor whose business is provincial or 
national in scope. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Should China promote trade credit? Much of the literature on inter-
enterprise debt in China answers in the negative, focusing on the State 
sector and soft budget constraints.83 This species of inter-enterprise debt 
did distort the State plan, since later extensions of bank credit went toward 
inter-enterprise arrears and trade debts recurred when credit was 
tightened.84 But as the proportion of enterprises subject to hard budget 
constraints increases, the law should presume that debtors and creditors 
 
 
 79. China: Courts Face Hurdles in Backlog, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 1998, 1998 WL 20479546. 
The article does not explain the methods used to halt execution, only that the local government refused 
to allow the company “to be treated like a bankrupt business.” Id. During a period of unrest due to 
unpaid pensions, the company eventually merged with five other State Owned steelmakers. Firm-
Action Steel-2, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 15, 1999, 1999 WL 7309215; Worker Unrest Erupts in 
Cities, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 2000, at 8, 2000 WL 30925626. 
 80. Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 71, at 287. See also PRC Supreme Court Issues 
Regulations on Enforcing Orders, supra note 65. The report quotes Supreme People’s Court sources as 
saying that some “local and department leaders have been found illegally meddling in the enforcement 
of court orders to protect their vested local and departmental economic interests.” Id. 
 81. See Seek Truth From Facts, supra note 71, at 275. The debts had already been reduced to 
judgment, but the creditor settled rather than pursue the ten separate enforcement actions necessary to 
exercise its right to garnsh. Id. 
 82. Enforcement Regulations, art. 12. 
 83. See Ou Jiawa, Policy Choices of the Central Bank: Goals, Instruments and Effects of Central 
Bank Controls in FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA (On Kit Tam ed., 1995). 
 84. Id. 
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are doing business on commercial terms and protect their mutual rights 
and obligations. 
Inter-enterprise debt is not an inherently unhealthy phenomenon. First, 
trade credit tends to be more flexible than bank credit, more available to 
start-up companies than bank credit, and more readily available in the 
presence of informational opacities that deter banks from lending.85 In 
addition, extensions of trade credit are frequently premised on business 
transactions, and therefore on increased output for both the borrower and 
lender.86
Unfortunately, China developed a system, which puts a creditor in a 
position to act only when the debtor is uncomfortably close to bankruptcy. 
A creditor is required to pursue real and movable property before bringing 
a garnishment action.87 The creditor must expend resources to prove the 
debtor’s insolvency. As time passes, and the value of the failing debtor’s 
assets dips below its liabilities, so increases the risk some creditor will 
remove the final support and the debtor (or another creditor) will file a 
bankruptcy petition.88 A creditor contemplating garnishment must 
therefore consider whether she is likely to be the recipient of the res, or 
merely an unsecured claimant in the primary debtor’s bankruptcy. 
Rules that generate optimal outcomes in the pre-bankruptcy debt 
collection system will not necessarily generate optimal outcomes in 
bankruptcy.89 In pre-bankruptcy, the debtor is presumed master of her 
affairs even as fleet-of-foot creditors strip away necessary assets. 
Satisfaction is paramount—a creditor is entitled to payment, and the 
system uses all the debtor’s available property to satisfy the debtor’s 
obligation.90
 
 
 85. See Cuñat, supra note 1; Allen N. Berger, Leora F. Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, The Ability 
of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses, 25 J. BANKING & FINANCE 2127 
(2001). 
 86. Cuñat, supra note 1. By way of illustration, Cuñat describes how Alcatel extended financial 
support to its customer, a Brazilian long-distance provider. Id. at 36. Alcatel’s annual report described 
how it sought “to support certain customers at a financial level through flexible credit systems before 
the bank system takes over financing.” Id. This shows, Cuñat argues, how suppliers use credit 
extensions to help customers with liquidity problems. Id. 
 87. This is an inference from the actual harm requirement—if the debtor had other valuable 
assets, then the primary debtor’s failure to collect the secondary debt can not cause the harm required 
by the SPC. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 88. Bankruptcy, once a rarity in China, is increasing. From 1989 to 1993 there was an average of 
277 bankruptcies per year. Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China, supra note 58, at iv. In 1994–
1995, there were 2,100 bankruptcies. Id. In 1996–1997, there were 5,640 cases; more than half of these 
were State-owned Enterprises. Id. 
 89. See Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 17, at 784. 
 90. See id. (discussing U.S. state-law remedies). The term “available” is used to distinquish 
between assets which are amenable to execution and encumbered or exempt assets. 
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In bankruptcy, the debtor’s ability to manage its affairs is severely 
constrained. There is a presumption that creditors will not receive full 
payment.91 Instead, the goal is to create a safe harbor for conservation 
activities,92 and then to distribute the proceeds according to set priorities. 
Creditors are divided into classes according to their interests as of the date 
of the petition. They are barred from taking any action against the debtor 
without permission, and must wait in line for whatever payment they 
receive. The equities of handling a particular claim under pre-bankruptcy 
or post-bankruptcy rules are thus not easily discernible. It cannot be 
simply a measure of legal insolvency,93 because conserving the going-
concern value of a business may benefit all debtors.  
Other constituencies will suffer as well if the company goes bankrupt.94 
Local protectionism may have acted as an informal mechanism to protect 
these local consituencies. Consider the Chongqing Special Steel case.95 
The local government ostensibly adjudged the company’s going concern 
value as greater than the liquidation value of the assets levied upon, and 
called an end to the proceedings. This ad hoc valuation undoubtedly 
included the cost of bankruptcy to non-creditor constituencies. 
Unfortunately, because extralegal methods were employed, the Case 
provides creditors without a discernible principle to guide subsequent 
action.96
Rules that favor diligent creditors may help keep recovered amounts 
within local economies.97 Strategic, informational, and political 
advantages may give local creditors greater chances of receiving payment 
in pre-bankruptcy debt collection.98 If, as in China, jurisdiction over debt 
 
 
 91. See id. (discussing U.S. bankruptcy law). 
 92. Acceptance of the bankruptcy case, halts payment of debts, disposal of property, set-off, and 
execution. Bankruptcy Regulations, art. 15. Property and claims are cataloged and verified. Id. art. 18. 
Certain property transfers within the six months prior to bankruptcy are also void. Bankruptcy Law, 
art. 35. These are: concealment, secret distribution, or donative transfers of property; sale of property 
at a low price and not in the ordinary course of business; creation of a security interest in the debtor’s 
property where no prior lien existed; accelerated payment of debts; or waiver of the debtor’s own 
creditor’s rights. Id. art. 15. However, a World Bank study of 222 State Owned Enterprise 
bankruptcies between 1995 and 1998 found no voided preferences. Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in 
China, supra note 58, at 5. 
 93. See supra note 48. 
 94. Professor Warren identifies the following constituencies: older workers who can not retrain 
for other jobs, customers who will have to switch to less attractive suppliers, suppliers who will lose 
customers, property owners who suffer from declining property values, states and municipalities which 
must forego taxes. See Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 17, at 787-88. 
 95. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, supra note 18, at 828-29. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See id. at 827. 
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actions lays where either the debtor or the debtor’s customer reside, the 
local creditor will have a strategic advantage in planning and pursuing the 
litigation.99 Local creditors are likely to have superior information, and to 
the extent that information has costs, receive a competitive advantage. As 
the trade creditors—State-owned, township, and private sector—are faced 
with increasingly hard budget constraints, it is reasonable to expect they 
will take legal measures to protect themselves, and thus become less 
reliant on local patrons. 
Valid public policy justifications exist for barring a creditor from 
intermeddling in a primary debtor’s business relationships. A creditor 
hassling a customer for payment threatens the debtor’s relations with that 
customer. While unfair, the debtor is hardly in a position to complain after 
breaking its promise to repay the creditor.100 The better answer is that 
unwarranted assaults on the primary debtor’s customers are inimical to 
conservation of the debtor’s asset pool. Trade debt is interwoven with the 
goodwill of business; it may provide significant competitive advantages to 
a company.101 Business goodwill could be the most valuable asset of a 
debtor experiencing a liquidity crisis. 
Incentive effects are more difficult to identify. It can be said with some 
certainty that a creditor will only lend when it expects to make a profit.102 
When a business decides to extend unsecured credit, it must account for 
the risk that when the debt comes due, the debtor will be unwilling or 
unable to pay. For example, trade creditors are likely to have mixed 
motivations for lending. Sales and foregone customer acquisition costs can 
subsidize their cost of extending credit. 
Finally, creditors’ interests are divergent. Trade creditors’ anticipated 
rate of recovery is much higher outside of bankruptcy. Wage, pension, and 
tax arrears receive a priority in bankruptcy. Secured creditors receive 
priority payment up to the value of their security.103 Even if piecemeal 
 
 
 99. Jurisdiction is where the “defendant” (beigao), either the primary debtor or secondary debtor, 
is domiciled. Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 14. 
 100. This is a variation of the “clean hands” doctrine, whereby a litigant in equity is examined as 
to “whether he comes into Court with clean hands, and can justly reproach [the counterparty] with bad 
faith and unfairness towards him.” Tompkins v. Wheeler, 41 U.S. 106, 117 (1842). In this case, the bad 
faith would be granting credit extensions to one’s customers while not paying a debt owed to the 
primary creditor. 
 101. See generally Financial Discipline, supra note 30. 
 102. This profit need not come from debt payments. As Cuñat points out, a trade creditor is likely 
to expect other benefits, such as deepening business relationships with the debtor. See supra note 1. 
 103. Special rules for State Owned Enterprise bankruptcy give super-priority status to worker re-
employment schemes that trumps secured creditors’ rights. Guowuyuano guanyu zai ruogan chengshi 
shixing quoyou qiye jianbing pochan he zhigong zaijiuye youguan wenti de buchong tongzhi 
[Supplementary Notice Issued by the State Council Regarding Problems Pertaining to the Trial 
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liquidation yields less than bankruptcy liquidation, trade creditors will 
tend to oppose bankruptcy. Therefore, a trade creditor is uniquely exposed 
to the risk that an involuntary petition will force a halt to its collection 
activities. 
Without the threat of a creditor-led bankruptcy, the debtor’s incentives 
to engage in conservation activities diminish.104 In theory, the debtor and 
all creditors share an interest in maximizing the proceeds from a 
garnishment. Greater symmetry between the handling of trade debts pre-
bankruptcy and during bankruptcy would give the creditors meaningful 
leverage against a creditor who threatens action that will too-far deplete 
the asset pool. 
The Chinese system imposes heavy procedural burdens on creditors 
while exposing them to an enforcement system that is unpredictable at 
best. Even after creditors satisfy their burdens of proof, they remain 
exposed to joinder by other creditors, and loss of right even if the debtor 
files a bankruptcy after judgment is rendered. The next section makes 
several modest proposals, which the Author believes will improve the 
balance for creditors with effective monitoring to help healthy debtors 
remain in business and sick debtors to be liquidated in bankruptcy. 
IV. PROPOSALS 
A. Procedural Change 
1. The Law Should Force Primary Creditors to Bring Suit Against the 
Primary Debtor, Not the Secondary Debtor 
In China, garnishment actions are brought against the secondary 
debtor.105 The court may, but need not require that the primary debtor be 
named as a joint defendant. Primary creditors should be required to sue the 
primary debtor, to the extent practical. 
 
 
Implementation of State-Owned Enterprise Merger & Bankruptcy and Re-employment in Certain 
Cities], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (1998, No. 8), at 312. See generally 
Donald Clarke, State Council Notice Nullifies Statutory Rights of Creditors, 19 No. 4 E. ASIAN EXEC. 
REP. 9, 9 (Apr. 15, 1997). Clarke describes the regulations as effectively “staking a claim to all 
valuable assets connected with the enterprise, regardless of the rights of creditors, in order to fund 
worker resettlement.” Id. 
 104. Amounts in excess of those required to satisfy the garnishment order will remain in the hands 
of the secondary debtor. Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, art. 21. The primary debtor or one 
of its other creditors can bring suit against the secondary debtor for the remainder. Id. art. 22. The 
primary creditor also retains an unsecured claim if there is any shortfall—anything that decreases this 
deficiency inures to the benefit of the non-litigating creditors as a group. 
 105. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
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From a formal standpoint, it was the default by the primary debtor, not 
the secondary debtor, that led to the cause of action. From a practical 
standpoint, the primary debtor has the most at stake. It stands to lose not 
only goodwill, but also the privilege of contract privity it once enjoyed 
with its trading partner. This privilege should not be stripped away without 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Allowing the primary creditor to sue the secondary debtor will tend to 
increase pre-adjudication harm and hamper efforts to mitigate the effect of 
erroneous or bad faith filings. There is a likelihood of irreparable harm 
before the primary debtor can act. It is also likely that the court will find 
helpful the primary debtor’s testimony regarding the primary debt, or 
efforts to collect the secondary debt. Thus, the law should presume that the 
proper defendant is the primary debtor. 
2. Non-payment of a Debt Should Suffice to Show Actual Harm  
The law should allow the creditor’s showing that the debtor is not 
paying its debts to create a presumption of actual harm.106 A debtor could 
rebut the presumption by showing the existence of real and movable assets 
in excess of liabilities. The inquiry should consider whether the debtor was 
likely to become able to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business.107  
This rule balances the creditor’s difficulty in proving the insufficiency 
of assets with the debtor’s need for protection from unmeritorious 
litigation. The well-informed creditor will know about a debtor’s financial 
health but likely will lack detailed information about the debtor’s property 
or bank accounts. Weak discovery privileges in China further hamper the 
creditor’s showing.108  
The debtor should be able to offer proof that it is likely to be able to 
pay the debt in the ordinary course of business. To take a simple case, 
assume D buys goods from C for 100 and resells them to his longtime 
customer, T, for 200. Sixty days pass. T has not paid D, and D has not paid 
 
 
 106. This is modeled on the United States Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, in which a creditor 
can create a presumption of insolvency by showing that the debtor is not paying its debts as they come 
due. See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (U.F.T.A.) § 2(b). 
 107. See, e.g., Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 711 A.2d 233, 241 (Md. App. 1998) (stating that in 
considering whether a shareholder distribution was likely to render the company insolvent, directors 
were entitled to consider the corporation’s future sources of cash). 
 108. Although there is no right to discovery of evidence, the People’s Court may have a duty to 
collect evidence, and the Court has the power to demand evidence from the defendant and others. Civil 
Procedure Law, arts. 54, 65. The court may compel a debtor to provide information about its assets. 
See Seek Truth From Facts, supra note 71, at 292. Despite this sweeping power, courts generally 
expect a litigant to provide details of a party’s assets. Id. 
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C. D has 500 in other liabilities. D also owns some movable property that 
would sell for 500 immediately, but in six months will be worth 1000. C 
threatens to bring a collection action. D calls T, who says he will pay 
“soon.” 
It could be that T is waiting for a bank transfer that has gotten lost 
somewhere between Lahore and Chengdu. In fifteen days, T will receive 
the money and pay D with apologies. D will pay C. If C is allowed to 
bring a garnishment action, C gains nothing, and D loses the goodwill of 
his customer.109 Preventing C from garnishing the D-T receivable would 
benefit D and hurt no one. 
Of course, it is possible that T is just dodging its creditors because it 
already resold the goods and spent the proceeds. Here, quick action by 
someone, either C or D, is critical. D lacks incentives to collect the debt—
if he collects, the proceeds will go to C, and D loses goodwill from T. If C 
is confident that a garnishment action will bear fruit, C should take action. 
If C is unable to state a prima facie case, and D is unwilling to collect the 
debt, no one wins. T can spend the money, and the value of D’s assets will 
decline, increasing the likelihood of default and bankruptcy. 
Either way, the issue is not the fairness of allowing a creditor to 
intermeddle, but whether a debtor who is not paying his bills is presumed 
nevertheless to have sufficient available assets to pay its creditors. The 
debtor, with its unique access to information about its own financial 
health, is in the best position to answer this question. If the primary debtor 
were able to rebut the presumption, the creditor would receive useful 
evidence of valuable assets amenable to execution for its efforts.110
Even if a presumption of actual harm would put an additional burden 
on debtors, there is no unfairness; a dilatory debtor is hardly in a position 
to complain after breaking its promise to repay. The law already provides 
robust protections against bad faith creditor filings. This is a conservation 
measure, helping maintain the value of the debtor’s business and providing 
relief from the expense of litigation. The Chinese system fulfills this 
requirement by placing the burdens of proof on the litigating creditor, by 
commanding the court to consider any objections by the secondary debtor 
or transferee, and by allowing a court to join the primary debtor as 
necessary. Creditors seeking protective orders must post bond.111 Case 
 
 
 109. This loss can be seen as goodwill value, but can also be represented by the cost of acquiring a 
new customer. 
 110. Bing, supra note 47, at 281. 
 111. Contract Law Interpretation, supra note 41, at art. 17. 
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acceptance fees are borne by the losing party.112 If these measures prove 
insufficient, punitive damages could be imposed for bad faith. For 
example, failure to investigate the debtor’s true state of affairs could result 
in a punitive damages award. 
B. Substantive Change 
1. China Should Grant First-to-File Priority to Pre-Bankruptcy 
Claims 
Chinese law seems to allow intervention in a garnishment action up to 
the time the court passes judgment. It is possible that the proceeds would 
be divided pro rata among the litigants in a sort of non-bankruptcy 
collective proceeding. A first-in-time regime would provide maximum 
payment for the first movant, but at the expense of conservation because a 
creditor might act strategically to obtain payment before the debtor 
declares bankruptcy.113
The Japanese Supreme Court, interpreting Japan’s fraudulent 
conveyance statute,114 addressed precisely this issue.115 Although the 
Japanese statute provides that avoidance inures to the benefit of all 
creditors as a group,116 the Court nevertheless held that pro rata 
distribution was not required.117 The Court noted the statute’s silence on 
the mechanism for apportioning the proceeds.118 Because Chinese law is 
silent as to the method of apportionment, a similar interpretation may not 
be barred. 
For these reasons, the garnished amounts should be distributed first to 
the litigating creditor, to the full amount of its claim, then to any 
remaining creditors. Any resulting remainder should be paid to the debtor. 
This method would correspond to the American rule that “[e]very 
attachment takes precedence over a subsequent attachment,” and that the 
 
 
 112. See MINSHI SUSONG FA [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 124-25 (Jiang Wei ed., 2000). Case fees 
are calculated as a percentage of the damages sought. Id. 
 113. In the United States, for example, most levying creditors are immune from challenge 90 days 
after the levy takes place. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2002). Most transfers to a pre-petition creditor within 
90 days of the bankruptcy petition can be voided. Id. 
 114. MINPO [C. CODE], art. 425 (Japan) [hereinafter Japan Civil Code]. 
 115. See Frank Bennett, Preference Rules in Japanese Bankruptcy Law, in JAPANESE 
COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 222 n.8 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994) (citing 
Supreme Court, Oct. 9, 1962, Minji Hanreishã Vol 16, No. 10, p. 2070; Supreme Court, 19 Nov. 19, 
1971, Minji Hanreishã Vol 25, No. 8, p. 1321). 
 116. Japan Civil Code, art. 425. 
 117. See supra note 115. 
 118. Id. 
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first-in-time creditor has priority in payment up to the full amount of its 
claim.119 Although there is certainly a risk of lost value, as long as 
safeguards are in place to weed out unmeritorious claims, responsibility 
for risk belongs on the debtor’s account. This approach would increase the 
debtor’s incentive to either collect the debt or negotiate with the primary 
creditor. 
Would such a rule be fair and effective? On one hand, allowing a 
second creditor to join a suit after another has borne the risk and 
completed the work necessary to bring suit hardly seems equitable. Liberal 
joinder rules could also tempt a debtor to act strategically to join a favored 
creditor, perhaps in hopes of dissuading the litigating creditor from 
prosecuting the action, or to keep the proceeds in the local economy. 
On the other hand, creditors would need to be constrained in their 
ability to use the threat of garnishment actions as a lever to extract 
unjustified payments in exchange for credit extensions. The Bankruptcy 
Law provides a six month window to reverse pre-petition grants of 
security interests, but not necessarily payments for value.120
The rule would have to be applied uniformly. Tax collection laws now 
provide garnishment and avoidance rights against tax debtors via reference 
to Articles 73 and 74.121 This may make the State Tax Bureau a weighty 
competitor indeed; the Bureau likely would expect priority in garnishment 
and avoidance actions whenever its interests conflict with those of a trade 
creditor. The Labor Department might also use a strengthened creditor 
rights regime to bring claims for wage and pension arrearages. 
These concerns militate not for liberal joinder rules, but for 
strengthening the involuntary bankruptcy remedy and harmonizing pre- 
and post-bankruptcy distributional rules for non-tax, non-labor creditors. If 
bankruptcy is a viable alternative for the creditor group, then all creditors 
similarly situated to an insolvent enterprise would have similar incentives 
to act.122
 
 
 119. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment § 492 (2003). Under state law such as under the 
Civil Procedure Law, the creditor may be required to forego some portion of the debtor’s property, 
such as where the secondary debt is for wages. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions § 1 (2003). 
 120. See Bankruptcy Law, art. 35. 
 121. The Law of the People’s Republic of China to Administer the Levying and Collection of 
Taxes, art. 50 translated in PRC Tax Collection, MANAGEMENT LAW, FBIS-CHI-2001-0429, Apr. 28, 
2001. Article 74 deals with fraudulent conveyances. Contract Law, art. 74. 
 122. The ability of a single creditor to obtain full satisfaction is counterbalanced by the right of 
other creditors, either singularly or in coalition, to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Any attempt 
to take too much out of the debtor’s asset pool, assuming the other creditors are sufficiently engaged to 
notice, would trigger bankruptcy. Rather than a winner-takes-all approach, the other creditors can 
force everyone into pro-rata sharing. 
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Pro-rata sharing may lead to an increased risk of bankruptcy. Consider 
again the Serengeti dogs.123 To overcome the loss to theft by hyenas, who 
neither hunt nor kill their own prey, the dogs are forced to hunt larger 
animals. In the same way, liberal joinder rules may force a creditor to go 
after more and larger assets. 
Assume D owes 200 to C. D also owes 300 each to E and F. T owes 
500 to D. C brings a garnishment suit against T for 100. Table 2 illustrates 
possible outcomes under various distributional schemes. 
Table 2: Hypothetical outcomes under pro-rata and first-to-file rules 
Case Rule Creditor Payment 
C 200.00 
E 300.00 
C files a garnishment suit. E and F do 
not join. E and F file sequential suits. 
Pro-rata 
F 0.00 
C 125.00 
E 187.50 
C files a garnishment suit. E and F join. Pro-rata 
F 187.50 
C 200.00 
E 300.00 
C files a garnishment suit. E and F do 
not join. E and F file sequential suits. 
First-to-file 
F 0.00 
C 200.00 
E 300.00 
C files a garnishment suit. E and F join. 
 
First-to-file 
F 0.00 
The pro-rata rule creates a strategic advantage to intervention, because 
sequential filing yields no payment for the third creditor. Some creditors to 
a primary debtor will share the primary debtor’s motivations: to continue 
the business as a going-concern. Those creditors will not act unless the 
system clearly disadvantages them for failure to do so. Furthermore, if the 
three creditors join the suit, our protagonist, C, receives only partial 
payment and must go after additional receivables, further decreasing D’s 
goodwill of business and increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy. This 
result is a variation on the tragedy of the commons, or “common pool,” 
and has been described by a number of bankruptcy theorists.124  
 
 
 This result is only effective if there is rough symmetry in the treatment of particular classes of 
creditors pre- and post-bankruptcy. For example, an unsecured creditor to a Chinese firm with 
significant tax arrears might receive a small payout if it must jointly prosecute its claim along with the 
State Tax Bureau, but receive nothing post-bankruptcy. In this situation, calling for involuntary 
bankruptcy would be futile because the other creditors would receive no reward. 
 Such a rule would not necessarily accelerate bankruptcies because it would provide the competing 
creditors with a strong coercive tool with which a non-bankruptcy solution can be fashioned. 
 123. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., Michael S. Quinn & Brian S. Martin, Insurance and Bankruptcy, 36 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 1025 (“Because creditors have conflicting rights, their debt-collection efforts tend to make a bad 
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Failing to protect creditors whole bargain could create ex ante costs. 
Creditors could create a chilling effect on transactions generally, by 
refusing to extend credit where there is not real or movable property 
against which a lien can be recorded.125 Moreover, transaction costs could 
increase as creditors seek to create and record security interests rather than 
face the uncertainty of execution in a first-to-file environment. 
2. Successful Litigation Should Result in Immediate Assignment of the 
Underlying Debt Obligations 
Securing a judgment should entitle the creditor to satisfaction of some 
portion of his claim. Under the Bankruptcy Regulations, upon acceptance 
of a bankruptcy case any debts owed to the insolvent enterprise pass to the 
estate.126 Thus, unless the debtor’s rights are assigned immediately to the 
litigating creditor, the proceeds are likely to be lost to the bankruptcy 
estate.127  
China should clarify the new rights created by a successful garnishment 
or avoidance action. A primary creditor who prevails in a garnishment 
action should immediately become the obligee, with payment owed 
directly by the secondary debtor to the primary creditor.128 The debt 
between the primary debtor and secondary debtor should be cancelled. 
This way, should the primary debtor file bankruptcy, the debt will not pass 
into the bankruptcy estate. 
This rule would create certainty. It would also force the debtor whose 
receivables are subjected to a garnishment action to choose between 
fighting the pre-bankruptcy case and declaring bankruptcy. Allowing a 
debtor to fight the judgment only to declare bankruptcy once a court has 
 
 
situation worse”) (2001); Thomas P. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy Sharing 
and the Creditor’s Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989) (“Bankruptcy sharing rules that appy only in 
particular cases [create] an incentive to expand resources to minimize the [cost to] them as individuals, 
thus reducing the wealth of the claimants as a group.”); James O. Johnston, Jr., The Inequitable 
Machinations of Section 362(a)(3): Rethinking Bankruptcy’s Automatic Stay Over Intangible Property 
Rights, 66 SO. CAL. L. REV. 659 (1992). Johnson describes the dilemma, where “each creditor has an 
incentive to act quickly in order to collect claims before others do. Although all may be better off in a 
[reorganization] proceeding . . . none have any incentive to delay a collection action.” Id. at 663 n.19. 
 125. Security interests can not be registered against receivables. Security Law art. 34 (stating what 
property can be the subject of a mortgage). 
 126. Bankruptcy Law, art. 3. 
 127. See supra note 50. 
 128. An opposing view was articulated by Wang Liming in An Inquiry into Several Difficult 
Problems in Enacting China’s Uniform Contract Law, supra note 53. Professor Wang’s view is that 
assigning the debt obligation not only violates contract relativity (similar to the common law concept 
of privity), but harms the interests of other creditors of the primary debtor. Id. 
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rendered judgment against him, serves little purpose except to deter 
collection activity and to allow debtors’ assets to be further depleted by 
litigation. 
At least one commentator has proposed imposing joint and several 
liability on the primary debtor and the secondary debtor.129 If recovery 
from the secondary debtor proved elusive, and assuming the primary 
debtor’s fortunes improved in the interim, the primary creditor would be 
paid despite having bet on the wrong horse. In effect, this result would 
turn the primary debtor into a guarantor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
China has created a system for garnishment of receivables, which 
includes most of the formal institutions found in mature systems. A 
creditor must first show that there are no real or movable assets against 
which to execute, and upon proof that the creditor is owed money, and 
proof that the debtor is holding valuable, mature debt from a third party, 
the court will allow the proven debts to be collected from the third party. 
However, China’s legal system imposes unreasonably high costs and 
risks on the litigating creditor. The litigation burdens are high, and 
problems associated with securing and executing judgments prevent 
parties from accurately assessing their chances of recovery. This 
uncertainty creates ex ante costs as potential creditors adopt risk reduction 
strategies and ex post costs as creditors are deprived of capital. 
Tomorrow’s trade debtors are punished for their predecessors’ 
improvidence. 
China’s laws should reward creditors fully for monitoring debtors’ 
stewardship of their assets and for stepping forward when necessary to 
prevent their waste. They should shift the burden of proving insolvency 
back to the debtor in default, the party who is best able to prove financial 
well-being. Non-payment of a debt should create a presumption of actual 
harm. Creditors should receive first-to-file priority for claims. Finally, a 
creditor who prevails in a garnishment action should receive protections 
against loss of right. 
Most of the issues highlighted in this Note are not dictated by the 
statutory language. The recently promulgated bankruptcy regulations show 
the Supreme People’s Court as a vital institution of legal change even in 
the face of legislative inertia. Many of the problems identified in this Note 
 
 
 129. Chen Yunfei, Interpreting the PRC, Contract Law, 14 CHINA L. & PRAC. 40, 44 (Mar. 2000). 
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derive from the Court’s prior gap-filling efforts, thus the Court is uniquely 
positioned to provide solutions.  
These issues are not trivial, and prospects for timely legislative change 
are far from sanguine. However, the issues highlighted here should not be 
viewed as overshadowing the tremendous strides China has made in 
giving creditors a range of options to protect the benefit of their bargains.  
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